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THE CANONS OF INDIAN TREATY AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A 
PROPOSAL FOR CODIFICATION 
The United States expanded in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies principally by acquiring lands from North American Indians. 
In exchange for such lands, federal-Indian treaties often promised United 
States' protection of Indian autonomy and rights. These treaties 
established a trust relationship between the United States and Indians. 1 
The judiciary, recognizing both the trust relationship and bargaining 
inequities between Indian tribes and the federal government, developed 
canons of construction consfruing treaty ambiguities in favor of Indians. 2 
Courts later extended the canons of construction to apply to federal 
statutes affecting Indians. 3 
Supreme Court decisions in recent years, however, represent a retreat 
from the use of the canons in construing ambiguous treaties or statutes. 4 
The Court has declined to apply the canons when interpreting unclear 
treaty and statutory language and has interpreted ambiguities in favor 
of the parties opposing the claimed Indian interest. 5 
Inconsistent use of the canons of construction in interpreting Indian 
treaties and statutes jeopardizes Indian rights, Indian interests, and 
the federal-Indian trust. Vacillating application also frustrates federal 
policies promoting Indian self-government and economic development. 6 
I. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220-28 (1982 ed.); Chambers, Judicial 
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); see 
also Treaty at Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 ("the Commissioners ... of the United 
States ... receive [the Cherokees] into the favour and protection of the United States of America 
... "), quoted in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550 (1832). See also infra notes 
9-37 and accompanying text. 
2. E.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956); Winters v. United States, 
207 U.S. 564 (1908); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I (1899). 
3. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); see also infra notes 65-73 and accompa-
nying text. 
4. During the 1970s, the Supreme Court heard 33 Indian law cases. LEG'4 SERVICES COR-
PORATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL-INDIAN POLICY 
14 (1981). The Court decided over 20 cases favorably to Indians in the first part of that decade. 
Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reservation Resource Develop-
ment, 47 Cow. L. REV. 617, 630 (1976). In the latter half of the 1970s, however, Court decisions 
demonstrate "something of a 'backlash'" against Indian interests. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORA-
TION, supra, at 14. 
5. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Barsh & Henderson, 
Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana 
v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 627,675 (1981); Clinton, State Power Over Indian Reserva-
tions: A Critical Comment on Burger Court Doctrine, 26 S.D.L. REv. 434, 444 n.37 (1981). 
6. For example, Congress passed the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 
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This Note argues that the canons of construction should play a cen-
tral role in the interpretation of Indian treaties and statutes. The Note 
proposes revitalization of the canons through congressional action codi-
fying the rules of construction into federal law. Part I traces the 
historical development of the canons to further the federal-Indian trust 
relationship. Part II analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions that 
demonstrate decreased use of the canons. Part III argues that strong 
canons of construction are necessary to the development of self-
determining Indian tribes and proposes federal legislation to ensure 
the continued vitality and importance of the canons of construction. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANONS OF INDIAN TREATY AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The canons of Indian treaty and statutory construction evolved 
judicially as a component of the federal fiduciary duty to protect In-
dian culture and resource rights. Citing language barriers and disparate 
bargaining positions,' the courts created unique construction principles 
that ensured the fulfillment of federal promises while preserving the 
substance of agreements made under coercive conditions. 8 
A. The Federal-Indian Trust Relationship 
After the American Revolution, the federal government of the United 
States succeeded to an established system within which tribes had a 
recognized sovereign status9 and legally protected Indian title of oc-
cupancy was usually extinguished by agreement and purchase rather 
than war. 10 The first treaties between the United States and Indian na-
(1982), to aid the development of physical and human Indian resources. Strict judicial construc-
tion of ambiguous treaties or statutes can impair valuable Indian property interests. See Mitchell 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell I]. 
7. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I, II (1899). 
8. See G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 198, 236 (1953). 
9. The United States adhered to the European discovery doctrine allocating fee title to new 
world land to the discovering nation. The federal government inherited this fee title subject to 
a title of occupancy in the Indian nations actually possessing the land. Indian title of occupancy 
was extinguishable by agreement, conquest, or purchase. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823); l E. DEVATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 99-100 (J. Chitty ed. 1893); D. JONES, 
LICENSE FOR EMPIRE (1982); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 53)-41 
(2d ed. 1983); Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 
31 GEO. L.J. I (1942). 
10. The first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, advised President Washington to support a 
law recognizing Indian title and prohibiting the transfer of land possessed by Indians without 
payment and federal approval. This led to the enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1790, ch. 33, Sec. 4, I Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982)). W. WASHBURN, 
RED MAN'S LAND/WmTE MAN'S LAW 55 (1971). 
Cultural differences regarding the concept of land "ownership" complicated Indian-non-Indian 
relations. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., TASK FORCE Two, 
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tions resembled the European-Indian agreements concluded between 
sovereign nations. 11 
By the early nineteenth century, however, federal-Indian treaties began 
to reflect the growing power of the United States, and the concomi-
tant waning position of Indian tribes. 12 Increasing dominance of the 
federal government over Indian tribes led to the development of a set 
of moral and legal principles designed to promote fair dealings and 
preserve Indian sovereignty. 13 These principles stemmed from the 
Supreme Court's characterization of the polit~cal tie between the United 
REPORT ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENT 77-78 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE Two]; see Johnson 
v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823); V. DELORIA, JR., Goo 1s RED (1973); D. 
JONES, supra note 9, at 84; Eisinger, The Puritans' Justification for Taking the Land, 84 EssEx 
INST. HIST. COLLECTION 131 (1948). 
Differences regarding the concept and value of land remain a problem today, particularly when 
a tribe claims compensation for lands taken by the federal government. See Clinton, Isolated 
in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1040-44 (1981); see also V. DELORIA, JR., supra at 7-9. 
11. The first treaty between the United States and an Indian nation denied any designs on 
the Delaware Tribe's territory, and recognized "all their teritoreal [sic] rights in the fullest and 
most ample manner .... " Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, a.rt. 6, 7 Stat. 13. The 
Supreme Court described this treaty as formed on the model of treaties between European na-
tions. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550-52, 560 (1832); see F. COHEN, supra note 
I, at 111; see also, Treaty with the Sachems and Warriors of the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 
7 Stat. 15; Treaty with the Wiandots, Delawares, Chippewas, and Ottowas, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 
Stat. 16. See generally 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES: INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA-
TREATIES (C. Kappler ed. 1904) (compiling all federal-Indian treaties); INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INDIAN LAW, INC., A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY 
INDIAN TRIBES WITH THE UNITED STATES (1973). 
12. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW CoMM'N, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FINAL REPORT 
47 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. 
For an understanding of the history of federal Indian law, see A. DEBO, A HISTORY oF THE 
INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES (1970); V. DELORIA, JR., & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, 
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983); F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATrvE YEARS (1962); 
w. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA (1975). See generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE 
ROAD (1980); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 47-201; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9 at 
68-91; W. WASHBURN, supra note 10; V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 10; D. JONES, supra note 
9; K. KICKINGBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED MILLION ACRES (1973); Strickland, The 
Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy or American Indian Struggling With Ape on Tropical 
Landscape: An Afterword, 31 MAINE L. REV. 213-21 (1979). 
As the United States expanded, pressures increased to assimilate Indians into the dominant 
non-Indian society. The first federal policy period emphasizing such goals began with the passage 
of the Indian General Allotment Act or Dawes Act in 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982). The 
Act, designed to discourage Indian hunting cultures, divided reservations into 160 acre farming 
plots which were allotted to individual Indians. The Indian became fee owner after a 25-year 
period of inalienability. Assimilated Indians also became United States citizens. Reservation land 
in excess of the allotted plots, deemed "surplus," was opened to non-Indian settlement. M. PRICE-
& R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 77-81. The Dawes Act remained in effect for over forty years 
before Congress recognized its failure. A total of 40,848,172 acres of land allotted to individual 
Indians was removed from tribal ownership. Approximately 49,000,000 additional "surplus" 
acres were sold to non-Indians. K. KICKINGBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, supra, at 23-24. 
13. Indian law principles are grounded in the concept of an Indian tribe as a sovereign political 
body, able to make and enforce its own laws within its boundaries. FINAL REPORT, supra note 
12, at 4; see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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States and Indian tribes as a fiduciary relationship. 14 The trust theory 
developed by the Supreme Court imposed an obligation on all three 
branches of the federal government to insulate Indian tribes from non-
Indian, state, and foreign encroachment. 15 The Court did not, however, 
elaborate the duties of the federal trustee. 16 Two distinct views of the 
14. Federal Indian law is often described as "sui generis" because of the unique federal-
Indian trust relationship, the obligations arising from the trust, :\nd the extraordinary power 
of Congress over Indians. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at I; Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial 
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as the Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the 
Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601,612 (1975). See infra notes 17-37 
and accompanying text. The origin of the federal-Indian trust relationship is usually attributed 
to two early Marshall Court decisions. See generally Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study In 
Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969). Both cases involved Georgia's claim 
of legislative jurisdiction over Cherokee lands within the state's boundaries, and the Supreme 
Court's power to determine the issues. 
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831), the Court held it did not have 
jurisdiction to hear an original action brought by the Cherokee Nation to restrain Georgia from 
imposing state laws on the tribe in violation of treaties made with the. United States. The Court 
found that the tribe was neither a state nor a foreign nation, and thus was without standing. 
Id. at 15-19. In the Court's view, the Indian tribes were "[d]omestic dependent nations," id. 
at 16, whose relationship to the United States resembled "[t]hat of a ward to his guardian." 
Id. This view established the federal-Indian trust relationship. See also id. at I, 20-49, 53 (con-
curring and dissenting opinions offering differing views of the federal-Indian relationship). In 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) the Court found Georgia statutes exerting 
control over Cherokee territory preempted by federal treaties and statutes. To determine the 
extent of retained Cherokee sovereignty, the Supreme Court interpreted relevant treaty clauses 
professing dependence on the United States as creating treaties of protection. Id. at 552, 560. 
The Court also analyzed the federal Trade and Intercourse Acts, 25 U .S.C. § 177 (I 982), to 
· find congressional recognition of Indian nations as separate sovereign political communities, "(h]av-
ing a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaran-
tied [sic] by the United States." 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556 (1832) (emphasis added). The Court's 
treatment of federal-Indian ties and analysis of the Cherokee treaties as contracts of mutual 
obligation confirmed the federal-Indian trust relationship. 
Another possible source of the federal-Indian trust lies in the Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1790, ch. 33, § 4, I Stat. 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 177 (1982)). See AMERICAN 
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N TASK FORCE NINE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW CONSOLIDATION, REVISION, AND CODIFICATION 22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK 
FORCE NINE]. 
The trust relationship may also have a constitutional foundation in the Indian Commerce Clause, 
which authorizes Congress to "regulate commerce ... with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CoNsT. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Treaty Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U.S. 535, 551-52, (1974); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
n.7 (1973). 
Yet another constitutional source of the trust relationship may be found in the Property Clause. 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 207-12. 
15. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); Seminole Nation 
v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919); 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on 
other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Clinton, supra 
note 10, at 1001. 
16. See Chambers, supra note I. The uncertain scope of the federal trust responsibility has 
often led the Supreme Court to ground trust duties on specific statutes rather than general fiduciary 
principles. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983) (recognizing a cause of 
action against the United States based on breach of a fiduciary duty arising from forestry manage-
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trust subsequently emerged, one promoted by the courts and another 
supported by Indian law scholars and Indian leaders. 
1. The Ward-Guardian Relationship- Most courts have limited the 
federal-Indian fiduciary relationship to some version of the "ward-
guardian" trust. 17 Under the "ward-guardian" or "passive" trust model, 
the federal fiduciary duty is limited to specific provisions of treaties 
or statutes; no legally enforceable trust covers all aspects of federal-
Indian interaction. 18 For example, a tribe cannot sue the federal govern-
ment for mismanagement of reservation resources unless a statute or 
treaty specifically demonstrates a federal duty to manage tribal assets. 19 
Because Congress can also vary the trust as it applies to all tribes, 
or change the trust relationship with a particular tribe by statute, 20 
tribes have little influence over the nature of their relationship to the 
federal government under the passive trust model. 21 
A corollary version of the passive trust defines the federal obliga-
tion in moral terms. This model requires only that the federal govern-
ment act in good faith when dealing with Indians. 22 
2. The Trustee-Beneficiary Relationship- The ''trustee-beneficiary'' 
or "active" trust model of the federal-Indian relationship has been 
ment statutes) [hereinafter cited as Mitchell II] with Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (denying 
the same tribe a cause of action for the same injury based on the Dawes Act which created 
no general fiduciary duty). 
Congress has expressed its understanding of federal obligations under the trust. Article II I 
of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided: 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their land and 
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, 
rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in justified and 
lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall 
from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserv-
ing peace and friendship with them. 
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, I Stat. 50 (Ordinance of 1787 recodified by the First Congress). 
11. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2916-17 (1983) (rejecting application 
of equitable fiduciary principles to impose duty on Secretary of Interior to favor Indian interests 
over a conflicting government project); see also Chambers, supra note 1, at 1227. 
18. A common law guardianship denies the ward any right to control its property. 39 C.J.S. 
Guardian & Ward§ 72 (1976). See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 126-27; AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLICY REVIEW COMM'N TASK FORCE THREE, 94TH CONG., 2o SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL Ao-
MINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 27-28 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE 
THREE]. 
19. See Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983); Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); see also Chambers, 
supra note I, at 1220-21. See generally Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 
1980), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
20. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (terminating the Menominee tribe 
from the trust, ending its eligibility for federal benefits, and excluding it from protection under 
federal Indian laws). 
21. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 126-27. 
22. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) ("Under a humane 
and self-imposed policy ... [Congress] has charged itself with moral obligations ... "); Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (presuming Congress acted in good faith in ratify-
ing a federal-Indian agreement). 
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advocated by scholars, 23 senators, 24 and Indians 25 but has not been ac-
cepted by the courts. 26 In the active trust paradigm, the Indian tribes 
would be recognized as inherently sovereign entities that have exchanged 
land and certain attributes of sovereignty in return for federal protec-
tion of internal autonomy on recognized Indian lands, and federal 
economic aid. 27 The federal government would have a legally enforceable 
duty to provide services, protect Indian sovereign rights, and aid In-
dian development. 28 
The active trust relationship complements current federal policies that 
seek to further Indian self-sufficiency. 29 This trust model would be flex-
ible enough to encompass changing Indian needs. 3° Further, Indians 
would play a significant role in tribal resource development decisions. 31 
Neither the federal government nor the courts have treated the alter-
native trust paradigms equally. The trust relationship has in practice 
23. See, e.g., Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 685; Clinton, supra note IO; FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 12; Israel, supra note 4; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 
2D SESS., TASK FORCE ONE, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELA-
TIONSHIP; INCLUDING TREATY REVIEW 179-80 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ONE]. 
See also Chambers, supra note I; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF TiiE UNITED STATES, TRANSMIT-
TING RECOMMENDATIONS FoR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT]. 
24. See Federal Protection of Indian Resources: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Ad. Prac. 
and Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited 
as Kennedy Hearings]; S. REP. No. 92-561, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
25. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 127. See generally Kennedy Hearings, supra note 
24; TASK FORCE ONE, supra note 23. 
26. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2906 (1983); Menominee Tribe of Indians 
v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). But see Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973) (requiring Secretary 
of Interior, on basis of fiduciary duties, to formulate a regulation preserving water for the litigating 
tribe), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 
(1975). Courts have accepted the active trust paradigm in other areas. The natural resources public 
trust doctrine, for example, requires land held in trust by state governments for the public to 
be used for beneficial public purposes. Legislative action to restrict public uses, or to remove 
public land from the trust are viewed with "considerable skepticism" by the courts. See Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. 
L. REV. 473, 490 (1970). 
27. The Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), envisioned this model 
of the trust. See generally F. COHEN, supra note I, at 180-206; Chambers, supra note I at 1221; 
Clinton, supra note 10; TASK FORCE ONE, supra note 23, at 180. 
28. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 136; TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 28-30; 
see generally the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) 
(1982); Kennedy Hearings, supra note 24. 
29. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text; see generally S. REP. No. 561, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1971). 
30. The public trust has proven to be a common law and statutory doctrine flexible enough 
to meet contemporary demands. See Sax, supra note 26. See generally National Audubon Sec'y 
v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983); Wilkinson & Volkman, 
supra note 14, at 650-59. 
31. See Israel, supra note 4; FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 127; see also Clinton, supra 
note IO, 1044-50. 
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frequently served as a justification for expanding federal control over 
internal Indian affairs. Judicial decisions, for example, have employed 
the ward-guardian model3 2 to give Congress great discretion in regulating 
all aspects of Indian life. 33 Further, "plenary" 34 congressional control 
over Indians allows Congress to abrogate treaties unilaterally, 35 to "limit, 
modify, or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the 
tribes otherwise possess, " 36 and to eliminate the trust relationship itself. 37 
B. The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction: 
Unique Principles of Interpretation 
Uncertainty over the scope of the federal-Indian trust relationship 
resulted in conflicts between the fiduciary duty to Indians and national 
land acquisition and development goals. 38 Treaties and agreements 
transferred millions of acres 39 of Indian lands to the United States 
without adequate translators to overcome language and cultural 
barriers40 and without government acknowledgement of instances of 
questionable federal dealings. 41 Although the courts did not use the 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 
U.S. 553 (1903); see generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978). 
33. The Supreme Court has, for example, upheld congressional extension of criminal jurisdiction 
over Indians on the basis of the trust relationship, after finding that the statute exceeded legislative 
powers authorized by the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution. United States v. Kagama, 
I 18 U.S. 375 (1886). Nonetheless, the trust relationship has not served as an independent source 
of congressional power since 1926. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926). LEGAL 
SERVICES CORPORATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST 
RELATIONSHIP 8 (1981); see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); See generally Laurance, 
The Indian Commerce Clause, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1981). 
34. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also Warren Trading Post Co. 
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). At one time, the Court intimated that congres-
sional control over Indian affairs constituted a political question, precluding judicial review. 
See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902). This position has been repudiated. 
See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 215-17 (1962). 
35. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 271 
(1898); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 604. 
36. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); see also United States v. Antelope, 
430 U.S. 641 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
37. See United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1937); 25 U.S.C. § 564 
(1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note I, at 215. 
38. See Nevada v. United States, 103 S Ct. 2906 (1983); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
553 (1903). "It is impossible to avoid the conclusion ... that the young nation's ideals were 
often subservient to its ambitions .... " Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 61 I. 
39. The United States covers approximately 2.2 billion acres. TASK FORCE ONE, supra note 
23, at 37. In 1887, natives held almost 2 billion acres; in 1924, 150 million acres, and in 1975, 
50 million acres. FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 305. 
40. Treaty negotiations between tribes of the Pacific Northwest and the United States, for 
example, were conducted in Chinook, a commercial jargon consisting of 300 words. In com-
parison, the average child has nearly a 300 word vocabulary by the age of two. Comment, Indian 
Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REV. 61, 62 
n.11 (1975). 
41. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 109. 
688 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:3 
trust relationship to void such agreements in their entirety42 , the judiciary 
did establish principles to lessen the effects of the unequal bargaining 
positions. 43 
Implicitly acknowledging that federal territorial expansion was 
irreversible, 44 the Supreme Court developed unique treaty construction 
canons that regulate specific federal-Indian transactions. These canons 
of construction embody the federal equitable fiduciary duties45 imposed 
on the United States through the federal-Indian trust. 46 The canons 
of construction are more than discretionary rules of interpretation. 47 
These principles are substantive components of the trust relationship, 
limiting ple1;1ary congressional power over Indians. 48 
The canons of construction divide into two general categories: those 
which apply to bilateral federal acts concluded between Indians and 
the United States, 49 and those which apply to unilateral federal acts 
affecting Indians. so Although the canons of construc~ion evolved to 
protect Indian rights in the context of coercive treaty negotiations, trust 
responsibilities require the United States to safeguard Indian interests 
in all dealings with Indians. The Supreme Court therefore extended 
the canons to ensure that Congress and the executive would uphold 
their fiduciary responsibilities when unilaterally affecting Indian rights. 5 1 
42. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). 
43. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Court formulated the first 
canon of Indian treaty construction in conjunction with its discussions of the protection obliga-
tion to Indians. 31 U.S. I, at 552, 581. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221; Chambers, supra 
note I, at 1214-15. 
44. See Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589, 591-92 (1823). 
45. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); St. Paul lntertribal Hous. Bd. 
v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1411 (D. Minn. 1983); Eric v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Alaska 1978). 
46. See, e.g., Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221-25; M. PRICE & R. 
CLINTON, supra note 9, at 137; see also Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 654. 
47. General interpretation principles are often contradictory, and are applied at the court's 
discretion. See Llewellyn, Remarks On the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950). 
48. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 665, 660 (10th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 1038 (1977); V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 46-50, 57. 
49. These include federal-Indian treaties, and congressionally-ratified federal Indian agreements. 
See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 223-24. 
50. Unilateral acts encompass both federal statutes and executive orders. Numerous statutes 
regulate Indians, and reservations were created by executive order until 19 I 9. See 43 U .S .C. 
§ 150 (1982). See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420 
U.S. 195 (1975); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963); see generally 25 U.S.C. 
(1982) (regulation of Indians); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 127-28, 224,493; IC. KAPPLER, supra 
note 11 (compiling executive orders creating reservations). 
51. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 
420 U.S. I 94, I 99-200 (I 975); FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 11 I; Barsh & Henderson, supra 
note 5, at 653 (noting that the canons provided perhaps "the only check on Congress that In-
dians could invoke"). 
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1. The Reserved Rights Doctrine- The reserved rights doctrine 
posits that Indian treaties "[are] not a grant of rights to the Indians, 
but a grant of rights from them - a reservation of those not granted. " 52 
A basic principle of federal Indian law, 53 the reserved rights of ''in-
herent powers" 5• doctrine ensures that tribes, as inherent sovereigns, 
retain all rights not expressly granted. 55 The doctrine complements the 
canons of construction as a guide to the interpretation of ambiguities 
that could result in the loss of sovereign tribal rights. 56 
2. The basic canons of Indian treaty construction- The original 
canon of construction derives from an 1832 Supreme Court case57 that 
focused on the Indian tribe's understanding of ambiguous treaty 
provisions. 58 Finding that the Indians did not understand the treaties 
to surrender internal tribal sovereignty, the Court construed the am-
biguous provisions to favor that understanding. 59 
The Supreme Court did not expressly formulate a succinct principle 
of construction. Rather, it determined probable Indian understanding 
and interpreted ambiguities from Indian perspectives. The Court subse-
quently refined the original construction method into a requirement 
that treaties be construed as the participating Indians understood them. 60 
52. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
53. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945 ed.). 
54. TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 41. 
55. The doctrine has, for example, protected Indian intentions to reserve fishing rights, see 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), and ensured adequate water supplies for reserva-
tion lands. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 
207 U.S. 564 (1908). The reserved rights doctrine also protects internal tribal sovereignty. See 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); V. DELORIA, 
JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 48-50; FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 110. 
56. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. I 91 (1978). See generally TASK FORCE 
NINE, supra note 14 at 28, 41 (Proposed Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy § 
3, recognizing inherent sove(eign status of tribes limited only by treaty or federal statute). 
57. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
58. The Court was interpreting the Treaty at Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, and the 
Treaty at Holston, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39 . See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 5 I 5, 
556-57 (1832). In reading the treaty provisions, the Court stated: 
Is it reasonable to suppose that the Indians, who could not write, and most prob-
ably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language should 
distinguish the word "allotted" from the words "marked out." .... [l]t may very 
well be supposed that they might not understand the term employed, as indicating 
that, instead of granting, they were receiving lands. If the term would admit of no 
other signification, which is not conceded, its being misunderstood is so apparent, 
results so necessarily from the whole transaction; that it must, we think be taken in 
the sense in which it was most obviously used. 
Id. at 552-53. See also id. at 581. 
59. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 546, 550-52 (1832). 
60. See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. l, 11 (1899). The Court stated that "the treaty must 
therefore be construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, 
but in the sense in which they [sic] would naturally be understood by the Indians." Id. This 
canon was patterned after the concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
5 I 5, 581 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring). 
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A related canon requires ambiguous expressions in treaties to be resolved 
in favor of the Indians, 61 and a final canon mandates that treaties be 
construed liberally to favor Indians. 62 
Congress ended treaty-making between the United States and Indian 
nations in 1871. 63 The Supreme Court extended the canons of construc-
tion to apply to the congressionally ratified federal-Indian "agreements" 
that replaced formal treaties. 64 The Court thus ensured that the prin-
ciples embodied in the canons would not be avoided by changing the 
form of federal-Indian land transfers. 
3. The canons of construction applicable to unilateral federal acts-
The origin and breadth of the canons of statutory construction are 
less clear than those of the basic treaty canons. The first case to apply 
the canons to a unilateral congressional act 65 did so on the basis of 
a prior Supreme Court case66 that actually involved a bilateral agree-
ment incorporated into federal legislation. 
Not all the basic canons of construction apply to unilateral federal 
acts. Congressional legislation and executive orders are not construed 
as Indians would understand them, for Indian understanding did not 
influence the formulation of the federal acts. The government's trust 
obligations, however, mandate the resolution of ambiguities to favor 
Indians. Legislation favoring Indian interests is thus construed broadly, 
while legislation impairing Indian interests is construed narrowly. 67 
The extent to which the canons of construction apply to unilateral 
federal acts either expressly or implicitly affecting Indians is not well 
defined. Some commentators argue that the canons of construction 
apply to statutes whenever they conflict with a treaty. 68 Others, however, 
61. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Winters 
v·. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). 
62. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,200 (1975); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 
665, 675 (1912). 
63. 25 u.s.c. § 71 (1982). 
64. Agreements were ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. See Choate 
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499 (1905); Act of Mar. 1, 1901, 
ch. 675, 31 Stat. 848; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 78. 
65. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918). 
66. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). See generally Decker, The Construction of Indian 
Treaties, Agreements, and Statutes, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 299, 300 (1977). 
67. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (construing Pub. L. No. 
280 narrowly to uphold Indian immunity from state tax); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 
(1974) (upholding hiring preference statute against equal rights challenge); Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (holding that the Termination Act did not ex-
tinguish treaty hunting rights); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (construing Indian General 
Allotment Act to confer a federal income tax immunity on allotment property); United States 
v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding traditional on-reservation eagle hunting not il-
legal under Bald Eagle Protection Act); F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 225; LEGAL SERVICES COR-
PORATION, supra note 33, at 9, 16-17. 
68. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 626. 
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limit the canons of statutory construction to statutes "dealing with 
Indian affairs." 69 Yet, this second theory of the canons may be quite 
broad, as Indians or Indian affairs can be "affected" by statutes of 
general applicability. 70 
The Supreme Court, applying the canons to a unilateral federal act 
in a recent decision, described the canons as "applicable to statutes 
affecting Indian immunities. " 11 The Court also required statutes "passed 
for the benefit" of Indians to be construed liberally. 72 
Whatever their exact latitude, the canons of statutory construction 
certainly apply to statutes specifically concerning Indians. The canons 
probably apply further to statutes of general applicability that impair 
Indian interests. 73 
4. The Indian treaty abrogation canon- Congress has the authority 
to abrogate or modify federal-Indian treaties or the trust itself. 74 
Nonetheless, courts construe legislation abrogating treaty rights very 
narrowly, 75 for the extinguishment of treaty rights has a highly destruc-
tive effect on Indian culture and tribal sovereignty. 76 
The treaty abrogation canon differs from the canons of treaty and 
statutory construction. The abrogation canon determines whether an 
acknowledged treaty right still exists, while the construction canons 
determine whether a right will be acknowledged, and what the scope 
of that right is. 
69. See F. COHEN, supra note I, at 224. 
70. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960); see generally 
Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination: Some Problems and Some 
Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 285 (1977). 
71. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976). 
72. Id. at 392. 
73. See generally United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Brecher, supra note 
70, at 293. But see Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that costly NEPA 
requirements apply to tribal leases). 
74. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132 
(1953). For a comprehensive treatment of the treaty abrogation power and canon, see Wilkinson 
& Volkman, supra note 14. Congress' unilateral power to abrogate treaties is one reason why 
the federal-Indian trust is often referred to as a moral rather than legal obligation. See Chambers, 
supra note I, at 1227. 
75. The exact standard varies. Compare Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 
U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (stating that congressional intent to abrogate federal-Indian treaties "is 
not lightly imputed") with United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) 
(asserting that courts will uphold abrogation only upon a "clear showing" of congressional in-
tent). Leading commentators advocate a canon requiring courts to uphold federal-Indian treaties 
unless Congress expressly states its intention to abrogate, and specifies which treaty rights are 
involved. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 645; see generally Note, Statutory 
Construction-Wildlife Protection Versus Indian Treaty Hunting Rights: United States v. Fryberg, 
622 F.2d 10/0 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980, 57 WASH. L. REV. 225 (1981). 
76. See Clinton, supra note 10, at 1040-41; Chambers, supra note I, at 1235-36; TASK FORCE 
Two, supra note 10, at 77; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 604-05; see also MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23. 
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C. Judicial Tradition of Applying the Canons of Construction 
The canons of construction operate as trust principles rather than 
as political techniques accommodating treaties to government policy. 
The principles underlying the canons are not abandoned with policy 
changes. 77 Since the first formulation of the canons of construction, 
the federal policy towards Indians has vacillated between attempts to 
assimilate Indians into mainstream American society, and efforts to 
promote the autonomy of Indian Nations. 78 When assimilation policies 
conflicted with treaty provisions guaranteeing Indian autonomy, 79 the 
courts continued nevertheless to construe treaty provisions in favor of 
Indian understanding. The reserved rights doctrine, for example, was 
formulated during a period in which federal legislative policy deliberately 
fostered the erosion of tribal sovereignty. 80 
The assimilation period from 1871-193481 witnessed a decrease in 
bilateral negotiations and an increase in unilateral federal acts affect-
ing Indians. The courts continued to enforce federal trust obligations 
by extending the canons of treaty construction to congressional 
legislation. 82 For over 150 years, these principles of interpretation have 
77. During the first assimilation period (1871-1934), the Supreme Court upheld a federal 
promise rendering Indian land allotments non-taxable despite a congressional act removing the 
promised tax immunity. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); see also Winters v. United States, 
207 U.S. 564 (1908) (using canons to find that Congress intended to include water rights when 
setting aside Indian reservations); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I (1899) (formulating the canon 
requiring treaties to be construed as Indians understood them). 
78. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n 
(1982); H.R. Con. Res. 108, 67 Stat. Bl32 (1953); S. REP. No. 561, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 51-82; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 23; R. BARSH 
& 1. HENDERSON, supra note 12; V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 9-10; w. 
WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 240; Clinton, supra note 10, at 1020-27; Goldberg, Public Law 
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975); 
Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, AM. IND. L. REV. 139 (1978); 
Comment, Tribal Se/f-Goverment and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 
955 (1972). 
79. E.g., Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Dancing 
Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-34 (Choctaw). These treaties conveyed land to the 
tribes in fee simple, pledging that "no part of the land granted shall ever be embraced in any 
territory or state." Such provisions assume continued Indian autonomy. 
80. In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the Court read a treaty phrase guaranteeing 
"the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places" as imposing a servitude on all 
the land granted to the United States by the signatory Indians. Id. at 381. Using the principles 
of treaty construction as the basis for determining the contested Indian-non-Indian rights, the 
Court elevated federal recognition of inherent tribal autonomy to doctrinal status. See generally 
Comment, Pacific Northwest Indian Treaty Fishing Rights, 5 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 99, 103-04 
(1981). 
81. M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 77. 
82. In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918), the Supreme Court 
construed an 1891 statute establishing a reservation to include surrounding navigable waters and 
beds despite a strong general presumption against federal conveyance of such submerged lands. 
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894) (announcing the equal-footing doctrine). The Court 
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been applied to construe treaty provisions conveying land "to be held 
as Indian lands are held" as insulating Indian hunting and fishing from 
state regulation, 83 to combine general treaty promises and historical 
circumstances into a conveyance of submerged riverbeds, 84 and to en-
sure valuable water rights to otherwise "lifeless" Indian reservation 
lands. 85 
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT RETREAT FROM USE OF THE 
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 
Since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court's use of the canons of con-
struction has become haphazard. The Court has given little weight to 
Indian understanding in construing treaties. 86 In interpreting ambiguous 
statutory provisions, the Court has often given no special considera-
tion to Indian interests. 87 
applied the canons to require that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes 
or communities are to be liberally construed." 248 U.S. at 79. 
Application of the equal-footing doctrine to Indian treaty cases has been severely criticized. 
See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5; Note, Montana v. United States - Effects on Liberal 
Treaty Interpretation and Indian Rights to Lands Underlying Navigable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 689 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Effects on Treaty Rights]; Note, Riverbed Owner-
ship Law Metamorphosed Into A Determinant of Tribal Regulatory Authority - Montana v. 
United States, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 264 [hereinafter cited as Note, Riverbed Ownership). 
83. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
84. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970). 
85. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 
564 (1908). 
There have been exceptions to the overall strength of the canons in interpretation of Indian 
treaties and statutes. For example, in Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), the Court con-
strued a treaty provision guaranteeing "the right to hunt upon the unoccupied lands of the United 
States so long as game may be found thereon" as temporary, ending when a territory became 
a state. This construction violated the canon requiring the treaty to be construed as the Indians 
would have understood it. See also United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). See 
generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 666-69; Comment, supra note 40, at 76. 
86. See infra notes 150-60 and accompanying text. 
87. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 
439 U.S. 463 (1979). The Court now balances state, federal, and tribal interests, an approach 
which sometimes neglects inherent tribal powers in violation of the reserved rights doctrine. See 
Rice v. Rehner, 103 S. Ct. 3291 (1983). See generally Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to 
Basics, 62 OR. L. REv. 29 (1983). 
Until the late I 970s the canons of construction enjoyed considerable judicial respect in the 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (using canons to uphold 
on-reservation Indian immunity from state tax); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 195 (1975) 
(using canons to uphold Indian hunting rights); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 
411 U.S. 164 (1973) (using canons to uphold on-reservation Indian immunity from state tax); 
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (using canons to uphold In-
dian treaty fishing and hunting rights); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. I (1956) (using canons 
to immunize Indian allotment property from federal taxation); United States v. Shoshone Tribe 
of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (using canons to find federal recognition of beneficial Indian 
rights to land); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 227 U.S. 355 (1913) (using canons to 
determine boundary); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (using canons to create reserved 
water rights doctrine). 
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Although the Court has failed to use the canons in some cases, it 
has never expressly repudiated them. Instead, the Court has effectively 
redefined the purpose and importance of the canons by ignoring or 
superficially employing the principles. 
I. Neglect of the canons results in the limitation of tribal 
sovereignty- The Supreme Court first indicated a change of attitude 
towards the canons of construction in 1978. In Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe88 the Court rejected the claim that an Indian tribe had 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. The claim 
was based on inherent sovereignty rather than on statutory or treaty 
rights. 89 The Court reasoned from early congressional acts that Con-
gress never considered the possiblity of inherent tribal jurisdiction. 90 
The Court then concluded that Congress would not have passed acts 
limiting state jurisdiction over Indians while allowing tribal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians. In looking to such an "unspoken [congressional] 
assumption," 9 ' the Court wholly failed to give effect to the canon of 
statutory construction requiring ambiguous statutory language to be 
construed in favor of Indians. 92 
The Court in Oliphant also disregarded the basic canons of treaty 
construction. Stating that federal treaties with the tribes "can be read" 93 
as an implicit proscription of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
the Court failed to apply the principle requiring ambiguous treaties 
to be construed in favor of Indians. 94 
88. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant and Belgarde, two non-Indian residents arrested by tribal 
officers, were charged with committing tribal offenses. Both petitioned for writs of habeas cor-
pus to the federal district court, pleading that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over non-
Indians. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Oliphant's petition. The 
court reasoned that no federal statute or treaty had deprived the tribe of its power to punish 
tribal law offenders. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Belgarde's petition for certiorari was granted 
before the court of appeals had reviewed his case. 435 U.S. at 195 n.5. See Note, Indian Rights 
- What's Left? Oliphant, Tribal Courts, and Non-Indians, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 75, 79 (1979). 
89. 435 U.S. at 195-96. At least 30 tribes were exercising criminal jurisdiction powers over 
non-Indians at the time of the Oliphant decisions. See M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, 
at 275. Oliphant dealt a severe blow to tribal government and to the federal policy of Indian 
self-determination. Note, supra note 88, at 75. 
90. 435 U.S. at 197, 201. The Court further reasoned that because the Major Crimes Act 
of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982), conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts over 
Indians committing certain criminal acts, it would be illogical for Congress to have left jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians in the tribe. 435 U.S. at 203. The Court concluded that Congress assumed 
that Indians never had jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 204. 
91. Id. at 203. 
92. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 675. 
93. 435 U.S. at 197 n.8. 
94. Early treaties provided that "[iJf any citizen of the United States ... shall attempt to 
settle on any of the land hereby allotted to the Indians to live and hunt on, such person shall 
forfeit the protection of the United States of America, and the Indians may punish him or not 
as they please." Treaty with the Choctaws, Jan. 3, 1786, art. IV, 7 Stat. 21, quoted in 435 
U.S. at 197 n.8. Such treaty provisions, drawn when parity in power still marked Indian-federal 
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The Court's clearest withdrawal from the canons lay in its state-
ment that Indian treaties must be interpreted "in light of . . . the 
assumptions of those who drafted them. " 95 The drafter was, accord-
ing to the Court, "the Executive Branch" 96 of the federal govern-
ment. The Court's rule of interpretation conflicts directly with well-
establisned authority that treaties be construed as the Indians would 
have understood them. 97 Finally, the Court ignored the reserved rights 
doctrine by assuming that the tribe had no inherent sovereign criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. 
2. Piecemeal application of the canons invites non-Indian intru-
sion and results in uncertainty over Indian fishing rights- The Supreme 
Court in 1979 signaled further uncertainty over the status of the canons 
in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Association. 98 In construing a treaty phrase reserving to tribes 
of the Pacific Northwest the right to fish at "all usual and accustomed 
grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens of the territory, " 99 
the Court first analyzed the intent of both parties, and applied the 
canons of construction to interpret the treaty provision as the Indians 
understood it. 100 
The Court recognized that the purpose and language of the treaty 
provision clearly secured the Indians' rights to a portion of salmon 
and steelhead running through tribal fishing areas. 101 The Court did 
not, however, apply the canons in determining the actual percentage 
of fish the Indians could take. 102 Rather the Court created a variable 
standard for calculating the percentage. 103 This standard infringes on 
relations, were unambiguous acknowledgement of the mutual sovereignty of the bargaining na-
tions. See supra, part I. Overlooking the canon requiring treaties to be construed liberally in 
favor of Indians, the Court interpreted these treaty passages as merely an attempt to discourage 
non-Indian settlement. 
95. 435 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. 
97. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see supra note 57-64 and accompany-
ing text. 
98. 443 U.S. 658 (1979). See generally Vessels, Treaties: Fishing Rights in the Pacific North-
west - The Supreme Court "Legislates" an Equitable Solution, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 117 (1980); 
Comment, supra note 80; Comment, supra note 40. 
99. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, art. III, 10 Stat. 1132, I 134 (emphasis added). 
100. See 443 U.S. at 675-79. 
IOI. See id. at 662, 667-69. 
102. The Court did not use the canons at least in part because it concluded that "neither 
party realized or intended that their agreement would determine whether, and if so how, [the 
fish) would be allocated ... when [they) later became scarce." Id. at 669. 
103. The Court determined Indian fishing rights to be a maximum of 50%, subject to decrease, 
of the annual anadromous fish runs. This included non-commercial subsistence and religious 
fishing. Id. at 685-89. The district court formula allocated both Indians and non-Indians up 
to 50% of the harvestable run; Indian religious and subsistence fishing would not be included 
as part of the tribes' "up to" 50% portion. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 
342-43 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). 
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Indian sovereignty by encouraging continued attempts by non-Indians 
to decrease the tribes' share. 104 
The Court's variable standard for determining fishing rights con-
flicted with the very canon it had used to interpret the ambiguous treaty 
provision guaranteeing those rights. The Court's holding also under-
mined the reserved rights doctrine. 105 Except for the initial treaty con-
struction that the Court considered to be mandated by precedent, 106 
the canons played but a nominal role in the actual decision. 
3. Disregarding the canons results in unwanted extension of state 
jurisdiction over Indian Country- The Supreme Court in 1979 also 
retreated from application of the canons to statutory provisions. In 
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian 
Nation 101 the Court held that the state of Washington had fulfilled 
all the federal statutory requirements necessary to assert state jurisdic-
tion over the Yakima Reservation. 108 The Yakima Nation argued that 
The measurement used by the Court to allocate rights was designed to ensure the Indians 
a "moderate living." 443 U.S. at 686. The Supreme Court extrapolated this standard from water 
rights cases such as Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963). 
104. Non-Indian pressures to change the portions of fish can result in federal intrusion into 
tribal affairs to determine whether less fish are needed to maintain the moderate living standard. 
See Clinton, supra note 5, at 444-45; Comment, supra note 80, at I 18-20. But see Vessels, supra 
note 98, at 132-34. Further, the unstable nature of the standard contravenes documented Indian 
concern during treaty negotiations to preserve religious and subsistence fishing needs. United 
States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976). 
105. Indian understanding would have included neiiher the agreement to close federal monitor-
ing of internal tribal affairs nor the agreement that religious fishing depend on a moderate Jiving 
standard. The reserved rights doctrine should have required the Court to develop a plan for 
fishing rights allocation which would have better preserved the tribes' reserved sovereignty and 
cultural-religious needs. The resulting conflict over Indian and non-Indian fishing rights has led 
to violence against the fishing tribes. See E. CAHN, OuR BROTHER'S KEEPER 76-77 (1969); V. 
DELORIA, JR., supra note 10, at 25-29. 
106. Ironically, the reserved rights doctrine was announced in the first of the seven Pacific 
Northwest fishing rights cases. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); see also Puyallup 
Tribe Inc. v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Washington Game Dep't v. Puyallup 
Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 391 (1968); Tulee 
v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919). 
107. 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
108. Section 6 of Pub. L. No. 83-280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 590, allows states 
with statutory or constitutional provisions disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian country to assume 
jurisdiction provided that "the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitu-
tion or statutes as the case may be." Section 7 of Pub. L. 280, empowered states without con-
stitutional or statutory disclaimers to assert jurisdiction "at such time and in such manner as 
the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to 
assumption thereof." See 439 U.S. at 472-74. Section 7 was repealed by Title IV of the Act 
of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406(b), 82 Stat. 79. The repeal did not affect any 
cession of jurisdiction made under § 7 prior to its repeal. 
The Washington State Constitution contained a disclaimer of authority over Indian Country. 
WASH. CONST. art. XXVI, § 2. Washington enacted a statute obligating the state to assume jurisdic-
tion over any tribe requesting it, without amending its constitution. WASH. REV. CODE, ch. 37 .12 
(1976). Jurisdiction was upheld by the Washington Supreme Court, which construed § 6 as not 
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the relevant federal statute established a distinct procedure requiring 
state constitutional amendment before the state asserted jurisdiction 
over Indian Country. 1 09 Although the Court recognized the canon that 
legislative ambiguities affecting retained tribal sovereignty must be con-
strued in favor of the tribe, 110 the Court rendered the canon mean-
ingless by requiring the federal statute unambiguously to affect the 
state's amendment procedure before invoking the canon. 111 In holding 
for the state of Washington, the Court ignored the canon of statutory 
construction that Congress acts to benefit Indians. Instead, the Court 
interpreted congressional silence to favor state interests in limiting federal 
intrusion into state government procedures. 112 
4. Ignoring canons of construction results in the bankruptcy of 
Indian-owned businesses- In 1980, the Supreme Court in Andrus v. 
Glover Construction Company' 13 retreated further from application of 
the canons of construction and substituted ordinary construction rules 
to interpret a general federal statute adversely affecting Indian 
interests. 114 The Court construed the Buy Indian Act (the Act)' ,s to 
requiring the state to amend its constitution where its legislature had passed a statute accepting 
jurisdiction. State v. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d 789, 337 P.2d 33 (1959). Washington later enacted a 
statute automatically extending state jurisdiction in eight categories to all parts of every reserva-
tion, whether requested by the tribe or not. WASH. REV. CODE§ 37.12.010 (1976). The Yakima 
Nation did not request state jurisdiction, and challenged the Washington legislation on three 
grounds: that Washington was required by § 6 of Pub. L. 280 to amend its Constitution by action 
of "the people," 439 U.S. at 476, before assuming jurisdiction, that Pub. L. 280 did not authorize 
assumption of partial jurisdiction, and that the Washington legislation violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See 439 U.S. at 474-78. The Court held against the Yakima Nation on all three 
issues. Id. at 493, 499, 502. See generally Goldberg, supra note 78. 
109. See 439 U.S. at 466-67. 
"Indian Country" is defined as: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including 
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the boarders [sic) of the United States whether within the original or subse-
quently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State, 
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 u.s.c. § 1151 (1976). 
110. 439 U.S. at 484. 
11 I. The Court stated that "[the canons) will not stretch so far as to permit us to find a 
federal requirement affecting the manner in which the States are to modify their organic legisla-
tion . . . . " Id. at 485. 
112. Erosion of the canons of construction was also apparent in the Court's construction 
of the federal law to favor partial state jurisdiction over Indian country. The Court failed to 
mention the canons of construction even superficially and ignored authority that the relevant 
statute was not intended to allow partial state jurisdiction. See 439 U.S. at 502-07 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); see generally Goldberg, supra note 78. 
113. 446 U.S. 608 (1980); see generally Casenote, United States Supreme Court Review of 
Tenth Circuit Decisions - Andrus v. Glover Construction Co. 58 DEN. L.J. 531, 538-39 (1981). 
114. General legislation can significantly impair Indian interests. See, e.g., Manygoats v. Kleppe, 
558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977). 
115. The Buy Indian Act, 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1982), provides that, "[s)o far as may be prac-
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determine whether the Act conferred authority on the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs (BIA) to engage in preferential road-contracting practices 
without first advertising for bids as required by the Federal Property 
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FP ASA). 116 
The BIA procurement policy111 conflicted with a 1965 general amend-
ment to FP ASA requiring the BIA to advertise publicly for bids 
when making purchases or contracting for supplies and services. 118 Prior 
to the 1965 FP ASA amendment, the Act exempted the BIA from such 
general bidding requirements, 119 thus promoting Indian employment 
and decreasing Indian economic dependence on the federal 
government. 120 The BIA argued that the Act also exempted the agency 
policy for FPASA requirements. 121 
Applying ordinary rules of statutory construction, the Court con-
cluded that the BIA procurement policy was not exempt from bid adver-
tising requirements. 122 The FPASA amendment did provide an exemp-
tion for the Act's authorization to purchase "product[s] of Indian 
industry." 123 The Court, however, was uncertain whether roads built 
by Indian-owned companies could be considered "products" under the 
Act. The canons of construction were not applied to resolve that issue. 
Instead, the Court focused on another provision of FPASA requiring 
bid advertising for all road construction contract negotiations with cer-
tain expressed exceptions which did not include the Act. 124 The Court 
concluded that FP ASA provisions included the BIA and thus required 
advertisement for road contracting services. 125 
ticable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry may 
be made in open market in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior." 
I 16. 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1976). 
117. The BIA policy required it to determine that there were "no qualified Indian contrac-
tors within the normal competitive area that can fill or are interested in filling the procurement 
requirement" before dealing with non-Indians. 446 U.S. at 609. 
I 18. 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1976). 
119. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 23, 36 Stat. 861, quoted and construed in 446 U.S. 
608, 612 n.8, 613 n.11 (1980). 
120. See 446 U.S. 608, 618 (1980); see generally Morton v. Mancari 417 U.S. 535, 549-551 
(1974); Chambers, Brief for Amici Curiae at 7, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980). 
121. See 446 U.S. at 617. 
122. The Court used general interpretation rules presuming that absent contrary legislative 
intent, additional exceptions are not implied where Congress has explicitly enumerated exceptions 
to a general prohibition, 446 U.S. at 616-17, and that courts must reconcile conflicting statutes 
to make each effective, unless Congress indicates otherwise. 446 U.S. at 618-19. 
123. 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1982). 
124. 41 U.S.C. § 252(e) (1976). The Buy Indian Act was exempted under FPASA § 252(c)(15) 
as a law authorizing unadvertised purchases. This would have allowed the BIA to award road 
contracts to Indian-owned companies without advertising if road construction were an "Indian 
product." The Court found it unnecessary to interpret the scope of the "Indian product" authoriza-
tion because FPASA § 252(e) expressly required advertising for road construction contracts. Sec-
tion 252(e) provided exceptions, but § 252(c)(I5) was not among them. See 446 U.S. at 615-19. 
125. 446 U.S. at 616. 
SPRING 1984] Indian Canons 699 
Making only a passing reference to the canons of construction, the 
Court found them unnecessary because the meaning of the legislation 
conflicting with the Buy Indian Act was "plain." 126 The Court's use 
of general interpretive rules indicated, however, that there was indeed 
some ambiguity. The decision represented a significant failure of the 
federal-Indian trust relationship by elevating federal interests in limiting 
'"high cost' construction" 121 above aid to Indian economic develop-
ment and independence. 128 
5. Failure to apply the canons limits government accountability for 
Indian resources mismanagement- In a second opinion in 1980 the 
Court displaced the canons of construction by general legal presump-
tions. In Mitchell v. United States (Mitchell/), 129 an Indian tribe and 
tribal members 130 brought suit against the federal government for 
damages arising from alleged mismanagement of reservation 
timberlands. The Indians argued that the Indian General Allotment 
Act of 1887, or Dawes Act, 131 created a trust relationship between the 
Indians and the federal government that implied a cause of action for 
fiduciary breach. Focusing on the government's sovereign immunity 
defense 132 rather than the tribe's breach of trust claim, the Court in-
voked a rule of interpretation requiring strict construction in favor of 
preserving immunity. 133 
126. 446 U.S. at 618. 
127. 446 U.S. at 612 (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 554, 562 (10th Cir. 
1979)). 
128. The holding in Glover Construction Co. led to the bankruptcy of numerous Indian-
owned companies dependent on Buy Indian Act contracts, resulting in increased Indian unemploy-
ment. See Brief for Petitioner, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980); Van Ness, 
Jr., Brief for Amicus Curiae at 33, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980) (report-
ing that after the Court of Appeals decision, BIA road construction contracts to Indian firms 
dropped $9 million although total BIA road construction increased $10 million). 
129. 445 U.S. 535 (1980). For analysis and criticism of Mitchell I, see M. PRICE & R. CLIN-
TON, supra note 9, at 202; Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued For Its Breach? The Sad Saga 
of United States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D.L. REV. 447 (1981); Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian 
Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 635 (1982); Comment, Indian Law -
Remedies - Statutory Construction - Trusts - United States v. Mitchell, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 
610 (1981). 
130. The Quinault respondents included 1465 individuals owning interests in Quinault Reser-
vation allotments, an unincorporated association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Quinault 
Tribe. 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980). 
131. 25 U.S.C. § 331-358 (1982). The lands were allotted under the Dawes Act with a 
twenty-five year trust restriction. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 extended the trust status 
indefinitely. 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note I, at 148; Comment, 
supra, note 78. The Quinaults argued that the Dawes Act created a trust relationship between 
the Indians and the federal government which was breached by the Secretary of Interior's failure 
to perform several management acts adequately. 
132. See 445 U.S. at 538; see also Mitchell II, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983) (rejecting language 
in Mitchell I suggesting that the Tucker Act does not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity). 
133. See 445 U.S. at 538; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202; Newton, supra 
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Although the Court acknowledged that the Dawes Act "did not unam-
biguously'' impose full fiduciary responsibilities on the federal 
government, 134 it did not apply the canons of Indian statutory 
construction. 135 The Court instead interpreted language in the Dawes 
Act that required the United States to "hold the land ... in trust" 136 
merely to restrain alienation and prevent state taxation, and not to 
create a broad fiduciary duty. 137 The Court concluded that "[a]ny right 
of the [Indians] to recover money damages ... must be found in some 
source other than [the Dawes] Act." 138 Replacing the canons of con-
struction in favor of Indians with a presumption against waiver of 
sovereign immunity, the Court denied the Indians their chance to argue 
the merits of the breach of trust claim. 139 
6. Comparing use of the canons to enforce and non use of the canons 
to deny Indian treaty claims- Two Supreme Court cases decided ten 
years apart graphically illustrate the changing influence of the canons 
of construction. Both cases required the construction of treaty provi-
sions to determine ownership- of navigable riverbeds in the face of a 
strong presumption against federal conveyance of submerged lands. 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 140 decided in 1970, framed the issue with 
the canons of construction and found tribal ownership of a portion 
of the Arkansas riverbed. Montana v. United States, 141 decided in 1981, 
neglected even to mention the canons and found that the tribe did not 
own the contested portion of the Big Horn riverbed. 
In Choctaw, three tribes sued the state of Oklahoma to recover royalty 
payments made to the state under mineral and gas leases in the river-
bed and to enjoin future interference with tribal property rights. The 
note 129, at 656-57; Comment, supra note 129, at 620; see also, Hughes, supra note 129, at 
473, 481, 487. 
134. 445 U.S. at 542. 
135. See id. at 542-46. Imposition of the presumption against waiver of sovereign immunity 
resulted in an "unusually" strict construction of the legislation. Hughes, supra note 129, at 481; 
see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202. 
136. 24 Stat. 389 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982)), quoted in 445 U.S. at 541. 
137. 445 U.S. at 540-46. Commentators criticizing the Court's narrow reading of the Indian 
General Allotment Act as limiting the federal-Indian trusteeship, e.g., Newton, supra note 129, 
at 680-81, have suggested two possible reasons for the Court's refusal to recognize a waiver 
of sovereign immunity. First, the Indian General Allotment Act was designed to assimilate the 
Indians and thus end the trust relationship. See M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 202. 
Second, courts narrowly construe waivers of sovereign immunity. Comment, supra note 129, at 620. 
138. 445 U.S. at 546. 
139. The Quinaults' claim against the federal government was for approximately $100 million. 
Mitchell II, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965 n. 7 (1983). On remand, the Court of Claims found the Quinaults 
had a cause of action against the United States based on fiduciary duties imposed by federal 
statutes governing timber management, road building, and rights-of-way; statutes governing In-
dian funds and government fees; and various regulations. United States v. Mitchell, 664 F.2d 
265 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (en bane), aff'd and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983). 
140. 397 U.S. 620 (1970). 
141. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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tribes claimed ownership of the leased riverbeds under treaties con-
cluded in the 1830s. 142 • 
Two relevant treaties conveyed land to the tribes in fee simple, pledg-
ing that "no part of the land granted shall ever be embraced in any 
territory or state." 143 Land boundaries in one treaty encompassed a 
portion of the Arkansas River without expressly including it, and 
described the southern line as "down the Arkansas." 144 The second 
treaty also expressly used the Arkansas to delineate the boundaries of 
the land grant. 145 Neither party disputed that if the United States owned 
the Arkansas riverbed, title to the riverbed inured to Oklahoma upon 
statehood in 1904. 146 
The Indian claims conflicted with a strong presumption that riverbeds 
were held in federal trust for future states. 147 The Court, however, ap-
plied the canons of construction and emphasized the broken federal 
promises leading to the tribes' forced removal to Oklahoma to over-
come the presumption and find that the tribes owned the contested 
riverbed. 148 The Choctaw message was clear; treaty and fiduciary obliga-
tions would be enforced through the construction canons. 149 
In contrast, ten years later in Montana the Court disregarded the 
canons in determining ownership of a portion of the bed of the Big 
Horn River. 1 so The Montana dispute arose from a Crow tribal council 
attempt to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on lands within 
the reservation, including those owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 1st 
Asking declaratory relief, the tribe claimed regulatory authority on the 
142. See Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Dancing 
Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw); Treaty of Doak's Stand, Oct. 18, 1820, 
7 Stat. 210 (Choctaw). 
The tribes disagreed on the portion of the riverbed each tribe owned under the treaties. The 
court declined to resolve that dispute. 397 U.S. at 630 n.7. 
143. Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee); Treaty of Dancing Rabbit 
Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-34 (Choctaw). 
144. Treaty of New Echota, 7 Stat. at 480; see 397 U.S. at 628-30. 
145. Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, 7 Stat. at 333; Treaty of Doak's Stand, 7 Stat. at 
211; see 397 U.S. at 629. 
146. See 397 U.S. at 628; see generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5; Hanna, Equal 
Footing In the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951). 
147. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894). See generally Hanna, supra note 146. 
148. See 397 U.S. at 622-27, 634-36. 
149. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
150. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). This decision has been heavily criticized. 
See generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5; Bloxham, Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of 
Montana v. United States, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 175 (1980); Clinton, supra note 5; Note, Indian 
Law-Ownership of Riverbeds and Limits to Tribal Sovereignty, 17 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 
189 (1982); Note, Effects on Treaty Rights, supra note 82; Note, Riverbed Ownership, supra 
note 82. 
15 I. Crow Tribal Council Resolution 74-05, quoted in Note, Riverbed Ownership, supra note 
82, at 283 n.118. 
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basis of its inherent sovereignty and ownership by treaty of the bed 
and banks of the Big Horn River running through the reservation. 152 
The Court held that the United States had not conveyed beneficial 
ownership to the tribe by treaty, and thus retained ownership for the 
state. 153 Because the tribe in Montana did not receive land from the 
United States in exchange for the tribe's original land, 154 but rather 
had conveyed original title to the United States, 155 the Court effective-
ly violated the reserved rights doctrine by characterizing the treaty as 
a grant from the United States. 
Further, the Court's analysis in Montana failed to consider whether 
the signatory tribe intended to give up ownership of the Big Horn river-
bed and banks. 156 Without applying the canons, the Court found that 
treaty language reserving to the tribe "the absolute and undisturbed 
use and occupation" 157 of the land surrounding the river was insuffi-
cient to signify Indian ownership of the riverbed. Finally, the Court 
required the tribe to overcome the presumption against conveyance of 
the riverbed. 158 Such a presumption departs from both the letter and 
the spirit of the canons which require that treaties be read to favor 
Indians. 159 Following the post-1978 cases retreating from the canons, 
the Court allowed considerations of federal and state policy to prevail 
in construing ambiguities affecting important Indian rights and 
interests. 160 
152. As in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), the treaty described the reser-
vation by metes and bounds. See Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. II, 15 Stat. 650. 
153. 450 U.S. at 550-51; see Barsh & Henderson, supra note 5, at 675. 
154. The tribes in Choctaw had been forcibly removed from their original land in Southeastern 
United States and given land in present-day Oklahoma. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 
U.S. 620, 622-27 (1970); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831). 
155. See 450 U.S. at 547-48. 
156. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun employed the canons of construction and 
concluded that the Crow Tribe would have understood the treaties to include the bed and banks 
of the Big Horn River. 450 U.S. at 569-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
157. Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, art. II, 15 Stat. 649 (1868), quoted in 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 548. 
158. 450 U.S. at 553. 
159. The Court reasoned that the treaty language could not mean what it appeared to mean, 
for the navigation easement retained by the United States in all navigable waters meant that 
"exclusive occupancy" could not literally be exclusive. Because no express language conveyed 
the riverbed, the Court concluded that "whatever property rights the language of the 1868 treaty 
created, ... its language is not strong enough to overcome the presumption against the sovereign's 
conveyance of the riverbed." 450 U.S. at 554. 
160. The Court attempted to minimize the striking differences between Choctaw v. Oklahoma, 
397 U.S. 620 (1970) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), by distinguishing Choc-
taw in a footnote as an exception based on peculiar circumstances. 450 U.S. at 555 n.5. The 
differing results are better understood as the consequence of the diminishing role of the canons 
of construction. See also 450 U.S. at 457-69 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Barsh & 
Henderson, supra note 5, at 678-81. 
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III. PROPOSAL FOR CODIFICATION OF THE 
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 
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Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the judiciary no longer 
considers application of the canons of construction to be a critical aspect 
of the federal-Indian trust relationship. Codification of the canons would 
reaffirm the canons' central importance in federal-Indian relations and 
would require their application as a matter of substantive law. 
A. The Canons of Construction: Contemporary Justification 
Judicial reluctance to employ the canons of construction conflicts 
with current federal goals that emphasize aid to strengthen Indian 
cultures and standards of living. In the 1960s, Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch began to advocate a policy combining recognition of 
Indian autonomy with federal assistance to develop viable reservation 
economies. 161 Entitled, "self-determination," this federal policy en-
courages Indians and tribes to strengthen tribal autonomy, develop self-
sufficient economies, and determine their own future actions. 162 In the 
last two decades, Congress has enacted legislation designed to give tribes 
a more decisive role in matters affecting Indians and to provide the 
financial means to achieve economic self-sufficiency. 163 
161. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982); Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450a (1982); Indian Finan-
cing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982); Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-280 
(establishing the American Indian Policy Review Commission); 25 U .S.C. § 1326 (1982) (pro-
hibiting, as part of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982), states 
from assuming jurisdiction over Indian Country under Pub. L. 280 without tribal consent); 28 
U.S.C. § 1362 (1982) (waiving the amount in controversy requirement for federal district court 
jurisdiction for recognized tribes); F. COHEN, supra note I, at 180-206; V. DELORIA, JR., & 
c. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 21-25; s. LEVITAN & w. JOHNSTON, INDIAN GIVING FEDERAL PRO-
GRAMS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 72-80 (1975); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 86-90; 
W. WASHBURN, supra note 10, at 243-45; Clinton, supra note 10; Israel, supra note 4; TASK 
FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 22-23; Wilkinson, Shall the Islands Be Preserved?, 16 AM. W., 
June-July 1979, at 32. See also Ickes, Tribal Economic Independence - The Means to Achieve 
True Tribal Self-Determination, 26 S.D.L. REV. 494 (1981). 
Former President Nixon was an especially vocal advocate of Indian self-determination policies. 
"[T]he United States government acts as a legal trustee for the land and water rights of American 
Indians [and has] a legal obligation to advance the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust 
without reservation and with the highest degree of diligence and skill." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI-
DENT, supra note 23, at 9-10. President Ford also supported a policy of encouraging Indian 
autonomy while preserving the federal-Indian trust. See 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1171 
(July 16, 1976), quoted in Israel, supra note 4, at 628. 
162. "Self-determination" goals give Indians "the right to make choices; to decide ... as 
individuals and as tribes, how to adapt to the modes of the general society without destroying 
the values they cherish." FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 80. 
163. One such act provided for the development of the human resources of the Indian peoples, 
see Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982), 
while another act established a revolving Joan fund to aid reservation economic development. 
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Because the canons of construction further the policy of Indian self-
determination, they are today of greater utility than ever. Commen-
tators have long recognized that the interpretative rule limiting treaty 
abrogation is central to tribal preservation. 164 Of no less importance 
are the canons of construction confirming and enforcing Indian rights 
in ambiguous treaties and statutes. Issues that turn on the construc-
tion of treaties and statutes include ownership of minerals and oil-rich 
lands, 165 right to preferential hiring, 166 and tax-exempt status. 161 In 
resolving ambiguities in favor of Indian rights and interests, courts 
can promote federal goals by protecting Indian rights and channeling 
resources to Indians in disputed cases. 168 
The Supreme Court's reluctance to use the canons of Indian treaty 
and statutory construction has led to disarray in the lower courts. The 
resulting abdication of the judiciary's traditional role in enforcing federal 
trust duties has frustrated Indian self-sufficiency policies. For exam-
ple, one lower court recently described the purpose of the canons as 
an encouragement to the United States to draft clear treaties. 169 The 
court declined to employ the canons because it reasoned that other 
interests outweighed the supposed policy of "facilitating 
communications." 110 In another case that same court applied the canons 
of construction in interpreting a federal- Indian treaty. 111 The court 
reconciled the two cases by explaining that the interests outweighing 
See Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1982). Statutes allowing tribes to 
enforce rights independently of the United States' actions on the Indians' behalf, and protecting 
tribal members against arbitrary and capricious tribal government actions are further evidence 
of congressional recognition of tribal sovereignty and governing powers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 
(1982) (providing means by which tribes can pursue claims when the United States fails to act); 
see also Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982). Tribes have criticized 
the Civil Rights Act as burdensome, and destructive to traditional tribal government. See generally 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, 
at 302; Israel, supra note 4, at 624-26; Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitu-
tional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1343 (1969). 
164. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14. 
165. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970). 
166. Compare Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding statutory Indian hiring 
preference) with Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980) (eliminating BIA hiring 
preference policy). 
167. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). See generally 
Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Central Mach. 
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134 (1980); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). See generally Comment, 
Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1261 (1971); Note, 
State Taxation of Indians, 49 WASH. L. REV. I 97 (1973). 
168. See generally Kennedy Hearings, supra note 24; Clinton, supra note 10; Israel, supra 
note 4. 
169. Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1334 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 
(1983). 
170. Id. 
171. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 
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the canons in the first decision were not present in the second. 1 72 Such 
an approach neither safeguards Indian interests nor represents a coherent 
expression of federal policy towards Indians. 
B. Codification or the Court? Revitalization of the Canons 
Through Federal Legislation 
The canons of construction could regain their important position 
in the federal-Indian trust relationship either through a voluntary return 
by the judiciary to the application of the canons, or by congressional 
mandate. 
I. Common Law Solution- The courts could themselves employ 
the canons in all cases involving ambiguous treaty or statutory 
language. 173 Because the canons were judicially formulated, this ap-
proach would require little more than strict adherence to precedent. 174 
Canons of construction elaborated by the courts can, however, have 
serious shortcomings. Judicial formulation and application of the canons 
has not always been uniform. Tied by stare decisis to different defini-
tions of the canons, courts interpret similar treaty language differently. 175 
Furthermore, judicial rules of construction may be ignored or 
distinguished in favor of conflicting rules of general interpretation or 
contrary precedent. 116 Finally, the trend in recent Supreme Court deci-
sions suggests that the judiciary is not willing at present to adhere to 
the canons. In those cases where the Court has cited the interpretive 
principles their application has been disingenuous. 
2. Codification of the Canons into Statute- Congressional action 
enacting the canons of construction is feasible and can avoid the 
weaknesses in judicial canon implementation. A task force of the 
congressionally-appointed American Indian Policy Review Commission 
341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983). 
172. Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1334 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 
(1983). 
173. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 645 (advocating a judicial rule 
for use in treaty abrogation cases). 
174. See generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at xi; V. DELORIA, JR. & C. 
LYTLE, supra note 12 at 48. 
175. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 62. Compare Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 
1323, 1334 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3537 (1983) (stating that the p_urpose of 
the canons is to encourage the United States "to express itself more plainly when it drafts a 
treaty [with Indians, thus ensuring the agreements are] voluntary in the sense that the Indians 
understood them") with Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (indicating that "[t]his principle is somewhat more 
than a canon of construction akin to a Latin maxim, easily invoked and as easily disregarded. 
It is an interpretive device, early framed by John Marshall's legal conscience for ensuring the 
discharge of the nation's obligations to the conquered Indian tribes"). See generally R. BARSH 
& J. HENDERSON;supra note 12, at vii-xv; V. DELORIA, JR. AND C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 50. 
176. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Mitchell I, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); 
see generally V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 50. 
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(AIPRC) proposed federal legislation in 1976. 177 The statutory canons 
drafted by the AIPRC task force, however, failed to include the reserved 
rights doctrine, and did not adequately separate the canons applicable 
to unilateral federal acts from those applying to treaties and 
agreements. 118 The work of the AIPRC has been largely forgotten. Con-
gress took no substantive action on the AIPRC's 206 
recommendations, 119 and did not enact legislation codifying the canons 
of construction. 
The 1976 AIPRC Task Force idea was sound and the need for federal 
legislation has grown more urgent in light of recent Supreme Court 
decisions withdrawing from use of the canons. 180 A congressional direc-
tive to courts to apply the canons would reaffirm the importance of 
the canons as a component of the federal trust obligation. The plenary 
power of Congress in Indian affairs 181 ensures deference by both the 
Supreme Court and lower courts to a legislative expression of support 
for the canons of construction. 182 Codification of the canons would 
off er Indians an opportunity to participate in the drafting of the 
canons, 183 and influence the development of the rules designed for their 
benefit. 
Codification of the canons could also increase tribal access to federal 
courts. Although the United States' Attorney's office files suits on behalf 
of Indian tribes, tribes may bring suit themselves where the United 
States refuses to do so. 184 Clearly stated legislative presumptions in 
favor of Indian rights would ease the often prohibitive financial burdens 
of litigation. 185 The canons require courts to both presume Congress 
177. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 61-73. The Commission was given only two 
years to complete its study but compiled much information within that time. Criticism over the 
choice of Commission members, see V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 23, and 
internal dissension, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 567-612 (dissenting views of Rep. Lloyd 
Meeds), reflected the ongoing conflict between assimilation and autonomy theorists. See also 
Clinton, supra note 10, at 979-80 n.2; Israel, supra note 4, at 627-28. 
178. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 73. 
179. V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 24. 
180. See supra Part II. 
181. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
182. No court has ever held federal legislation concerning Indians to be outside the scope 
of congressional power. See generally United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 615 n.66. 
183. Indian participation could lessen the effects of strong anti-Indian lobbies. See generally 
M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 90. Indians are American citizens, with full voting 
rights. 8 U.S.C. § !40l(b) (1982). Despite financial and numerical handicaps, certain Indian lob-
bying efforts have achieved considerable success. See Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550, 
84 Stat. 1437 (restoring the Sacred Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblos of New Mexico); see also 
R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at 218-20, 251-52; V. DELORIA, JR., supra note 10, 
at 7-11; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14 at 660 n.339. 
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982). 
185. Indian incomes are below the national average and more Indians are below the poverty 
level than non-Indians. FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 91. In 1969, 40-50% of Indians 16 
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intended to act for the benefit of Indians and to construe ambiguous 
language in favor of Indian interests. Indians could thus more easily 
establish a cause of action and meet their evidentiary burdens without 
presenting voluminous proof of congressional intent. 186 
A set of well-defined statutory canons would ensure uniformity in 
application of the canons. This consistency would provide greater cer-
tainty in the interpretation of treaties and statutes and make comparisons 
between different treaties more relevant. 187 
Finally, codification of the canons would not require Congress to 
create an elaborate new doctrine, or depart from current policies. 
Because the canons have been in use for 150 years, there is much 
material from which to draft a statute. 188 
C. The Elements of A Model Statute 
Legislative canons of construction should require the use of the canons 
in any issue involving the interpretation of ambiguous language in In-
dian treaties, statutes, agreements, and executive orders. 189 Federal enact-
ment of the interpretive principles should adhere to basic principles 
of federal-Indian law. Definitions for terms such as "Indian" and "In-
dian tribe" should be taken from existing legislation to avoid judicial 
years or older were unemployed, in comparison to a 4% non-Indian unemployment average. 
Sonnenberg, The Role of the Federal Government in Present-Day Indian Industrial and Com-
mercial Development: A Discussion in SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMICS IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT 
ECONOMIC COMM., 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss., TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR NATNE AMERICAN 
COMMUNITIES 310 (Comm. Print 1969); see generally National Congress of American Indians, 
Economic Development of the American Indian and His Lands, in SuBCOMM. ON ECONOMICS 
IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., supra, at 410, 411-12. 
186. The analogous Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (MEPA) effected a similar 
reduction of evidentiary burdens. MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 691.1201-1207 (1979). The statute lessens 
the requirement for a prima facie case. See MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 691.1203 (1979). This avoids 
protracted discovery and makes litigation available to individual citizens. See also Federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-941, 951, 958 
(1982); Federal Longshoremans' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 
(1982). See generally Haynes, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act in its Sixth Year: Substan-
tive Environmental Law From Citizen Suits 53 J. URB. L. 589 (I 976); Trauberman, Compen-
sating Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. I, 11-14, 23-25 (1981). 
187. Two problems appear unavoidable. First, the definition of an ambiguity that triggers 
use of the codified canons is itself uncertain. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43-48 (1975) (discussing ambiguities inherent in language). Thus, 
courts may circumvent the codified canons by determining that the questioned language is unam-
biguous. But see id. at 105 (finding ambiguities highly probable in cross-cultural communication). 
Second, courts may develop precedent that narrowly limits situations to which the canons can 
be applied. See generally, R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 12, at x-xii (discussing prece-
dent as limiting courts). This could defeat the purpose of the canons, by requiring Indians to 
prove that the canons should be invoked. Congress could enact legislation to change such a 
practice, but a congressional check may work better in theory than in fact. 
188. E.g. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
189. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 62-3. 
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uncertainty as to which peoples may invoke the statutory 
presumptions. 190 The organization of the statute should separate the 
canons of construction applicable to bilateral treaties and agreements 
from those applicable to unilateral federal acts. A division between 
the differing types of government action affecting Indians would clarify 
which canons apply to each and emphasize the equal importance of 
the canons in construing unilateral federal acts. 191 
The section enumerating the canons of construction applicable to 
federal-Indian treaties and agreements should incorporate the reserved 
rights doctrine, requiring treaties and agreements to be read as reserv-
ing to Indians all rights that were not expressly granted away. 192 The 
reserved rights principle expands Indian rights beyond the language 
of a treaty by reading its provisions in light of tribal sovereignty and 
exclusive land occupancy rights. 193 The doctrine is the guiding princi-
ple for all the canons of construction: in the absence of clear granting 
language the right in question remains in the tribe. 194 To clarify its 
importance, the reserved rights doctrine should be enumerated first. 
The canons of construction developed by the courts 195 should follow 
the reserved rights doctrine. These rules could be formulated as 
refinements and applications of the reserved rights doctrine or as 
separate provisions. Either arrangement must express three policies: 
(1) federal-Indian treaties and agreements must be construed as the 
participating tribes understood them; 196 (2) treaties and agreements must 
190. Definitions such as those in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(a), (b) (1982) are best, because they are political rather than racial. Such 
definitions, however, exclude Indians not members of tribes federally "recognized." 25 U.S.C. 
§ 450b(a), (b) (1982). 
Adding an alternative eligibility standard based on some quantum of Indian blood may be 
necessary to ensure inclusion of Indians from tribes whose federal recognition was terminated 
in the 1950's or from tribes that have never been federally recognized. See generally FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 12, at 107-09 (defining Indians), 447-56 (describing present conditions of terminated 
tribes). 
191. Some commentators have criticized application of the canons to unilateral acts. See gener-
ally Decker, supra note 66. A separate provision devoted to the unilateral canons would eliminate 
doubt as to their validity. See infra note 200. 
192. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). Although the reserved rights 
doctrine is not often categorized as a canon of construction, it should be. Compare F. COHEN, 
supra note I, at 222 (not describing the reserved rights doctrine as a canon of construction) 
with V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 48 (including reserved rights doctrine as 
a canon of construction). See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. 
193. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-601 (1963) (protecting reserved rights to 
water); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (recognizing reserved rights to water); 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (protecting reserved rights of fishing); V. DELORIA, 
JR. & C. LYTLE, supra note 12, at 49. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) 
(recognizing inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes). 
194. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
195. See infra notes 196-98. 
196. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,631 (1970); United States v. Shoshone 
Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. Ill, 116 (1938); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913); 
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be read liberally to benefit the Indian parties; 197 and (3) ambiguities 
in treaties and agreements must be interpreted in favor of the Indian 
claimants. 198 The statute should expressly state that extrinsic evidence 
including historical circumstances and documents relating to the negotia-
tions is relevant to determining the intent of the parties to a treaty 
or agreement unless Congress has clearly expressed otherwise on the 
face of the documents. 199 
The section of the statute enumerating the canons applicable to 
unilateral federal acts should ensure that statutes and executive orders 
are read to benefit Indian rights and interests. 200 The legislation should 
expressly apply the canons of construction to statutes of general ap-
plicability that infringe on Indian interests. 201 The Act should also clarify 
that the construction favoring Indian interests can be overcome only 
by evidence of clearly expressed contrary congressional intent. 202 The 
judicial canons of construction applicable to unilateral federal acts 
should be lisited separately: (1) statutes and executive orders must be 
liberally construed to the benefit of the affected Indians or tribes; 203 
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. I, II (1899); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-54, 582 (1832). 
197. E.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,200 (1975); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 
236 (1974); Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 
(1942); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,675 (1912); United States v. Walker River Irrig. Dist., 
104 F.2d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 1939). 
198. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter 
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). 
199. See TASK FoRCE NINE, supra note 14, at 73. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 
620 (1970) provides a good example of this principle. 
200. A major criticism of the canons as applied to statutes is that unilaterally enacted legisla-
tion does not involve questions of Indian understanding and unfair bargaining positions. See 
Decker, supra note 66. The canons serve, however, to further the federal trust responsibility, 
independent of their function as bargaining position equalizers. See generally Chambers, supra 
note I, at 1214. 
A second objection to application of the canons to statutes is that Indians are represented 
in Congress. But see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 14, at 660 n.339 (arguing that because 
of their small numbers and budgets, Indians cannot overcome powerful opposing lobbies). This 
argument does not lessen the government's obligation under the federal-Indian trust to act in 
the best interests of the Indians. The canons of construction, ensuring that ambiguities will not 
be resolved against the Indians, serve to enforce that obligation. 
201. Because Congress may unknowingly pass a statute which in practice has a negative im-
pact on an Indian right or interest, a presumption that Congress did not intend to impair such 
interests is necessary. See United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Brecher, supra 
note 70. Under such a presumption, Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608 (1980), might 
have been decided differently. See supra notes I 13-28 and accompanying text. 
202. A "clear expression" standard is similar to the standard advocated by Wilkinson & 
Volkman, supra note 14, at 645, for determining congressional intent to abrogate an Indian treaty. 
Such a standard ensures that Congress has considered carefully legislation affecting Indian interests. 
203. E.g. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 
I, 6-7 (1956); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). 
The statute should expressly include both tribes and Indian individuals because some statutes 
are tailored to benefit individual Indians. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 44-47 (1982) (hiring preference 
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and (2) ambiguities in such acts must be resolved in favor of the af-
fected Indians or tribes. 204 
A third section should direct the courts to consider federal trust obliga-
tions and the federal policy of Indian self-determination when inter-
preting Indian treaties and statutes. 205 Such a rule would reaffirm the 
viability of the federal-Indian trust in the era of self-determination206 
and clarify congressional approval of the preservation of tribal autonomy 
through economic development using treaty guaranteed resources. 201 
A final rule should require the courts to place burdens of persuasion 
and proof on the non-Indian party to show clearly expressed congres-
sional intent to impair Indian rights or property. 208 This provision would 
clarify that Indian claimants cannot be required to prove that their 
fiduciary trustee did not intend to breach its duty. The canons are a 
presumption that the trustee intended to act in the beneficiaries' best 
interest; 209 the opposing party must rebut this presumption. 
D. A Model Statute 
The following statute is one model of codified canons of Indian treaty 
and statutory construction. 210 
(a) For the purposes of this Act, the term-
(1) 
(2) 
"Indian" means a person who is a member of an 
Indian tribe; 211 
"Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, 
statutes); see also TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 106-24. 
204. E.g. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411-13 (1968); Alaska 
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87 (1918); see TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 
14, at 73. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. 
205. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 450(a) (1982); S. REP. No. 561, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); 
TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 28-30. 
This principle would probably require a different result in decisions such as Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
206. Codified canons would show a firm commitment by Congress to Indian autonomy, ana 
reassure Indians that self-determination policies will not lead to termination of the trust itself. 
See generally Israel, supra note 4, at 628 n.40. 
207. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 305-65; Ickes, supra note 161. 
208. Congress has enacted a statute placing the burden of proof on "white person[s]" in 
litigation between Indians and whites over property rights. 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1982). This statute 
"clearly evidences a protectionist policy with regard to Indians." Omaha Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 
575 F.2d 620, 632 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 653 (1979); see 34 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 439, 444 (1925) (recognizing the federal government's continuing policy of construing 
treaties and statutes to the Indians' benefit). A similar protectionist policy should require the 
party contesting an Indian interest to show that the federal trustee acted to impair the beneficiaries' 
rights. 
209. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975); 
F. COHEN, supra note I, at 221- 25; M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 9, at 137; Barsh & 
Henderson, supra note 5, at 654. 
210. See TASK FORCE NINE, supra note 14, at 73; supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
211. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(a) (1982). 
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or other organized group or community, including 
any Alaska Native village or regional or village cor-
poration as defined in or established pursuant to the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [Title 43 United 
States Code Sections 1601-1616] which is recognized 
as eligible for the special programs and services pro-
vided by the United States to Indians because of their 
status as lndians; 212 and, 
(3) "Federal fiduciary obligation" means a federal 
equitable trust relationship in which the federal 
government is trustee and any Indian or Indian tribe 
is the beneficiary. 213 
(b) All federal treaties, statutorily ratified agreements, statutes, 
and executive orders reserving, granting, or affecting rights 
to or of any Indian or Indian tribe shall be subject to the 
following principles: 
(1) Any treaty or statutorily ratified agreement between 
the federal government and any Indian or Indian tribe: 
(A) shall be read as a grant from the Indian or In-
dian tribe to the federal government; 
(B) shall be read as reserving to the Indian or In-
dian tribe any right not expressly granted; 
(C) shall be read as the Indian or Indian tribe par-
ticipating in the relevant treaty or agreement 
negotiations would have understood the 
document; 
(i) For purposes of this subsection Indian 
understanding shall be determined from the 
relevant treaty and agreement negotiations, 
and the historical context of and cir-
cumstances surrounding such negotiations; 
(D) shall be read liberally in favor of the Indian 
or Indian tribe; and, 
(E) shall be read to resolve any ambiguity within 
the document in favor of the Indian or Indian 
tribe. 
(2) Any statute or executive order affecting any right or 
interest of any Indian or Indian tribe: 
(A) shall be construed narrowly where such federal 
act harms such right or interest; 
212. See 25 U.S.C. § 450b(b) (1982). 
711 
213. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1978); St. Paul lntertribal Hous. 
Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1411 (D. Minn. 1983); Eric v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 464 F. Supp. 44, 46 (0. Alaska 1978). 
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(B) shall be construed broadly where such federal 
act benefits such right or interest; 
(C) shall be construed to avoid impairment of any 
such right or interest where the federal act is 
intended to have general applicability; 
(D) shall be construed liberally in favor of the af-
fected Indian or Indian tribe; and, 
(E) shall be construed to resolve any ambiguity 
within the federal act in favor of the affected 
Indian or Indian tribe. 
(3) Burdens of proof and persuasion shall be on the par-
ty contesting a right or interest claimed by an Indian 
or Indian tribe to show clearly expressed congressional 
intent to act contrary to such right or interest. 
(4) All such treaties, statutorily ratified agreements, 
statutes, and executive orders shall be construed to 
further: 
(A) fulfillment of the federal fiduciary obligation 
to any Indian or Indian tribe; and, 
(B) federal policy to promote Indian self-
government and Indian economic development. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting Indian treaties or statutes 
affecting Indians have retreated from meaningful application of the 
canons of construction developed over the past 150 years. Courts created 
the canons to enforce trust obligations of the federal government and 
protect Indian rights. . 
The canons can further the contemporary federal policy of Indian 
autonomy. Courts apply the canons inconsistently; Congress should 
enact legislation requiring judicial use of the canons to resolve am-
biguities in. federal acts affecting Indians. 
-Ji/(De La Hunt 
